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Introduction 
Rationing 
In a recent article, Helmut Bester contrasts two definitions 
of credit rationing. On the one hand, "credit rationing is said 
to occur when some borrowers receive a loan and others do not, 
although the latter would accept higher interest payments or an 
increase in collateral" (Bester, p. 850, my underlining) 1 • This 
notion of rationing is clearly different from that proposed by 
3affee and Russell: "credit rationing occurs when lenders quote 
an interest rate on loans and then proceed to supply a smaller 
loan size than demanded by the borrowers" (Bester, p. 850, my 
underlining). The latter could be labeled guantity rationing, 
while the first definition could be called credit denial and in 
practice could be considered an extreme case of quantity 
rationing, i.e., when the loan amount granted is zero. Bester 
then proceeds to show that "no credit rationing will occur in 
equilibrium if banks compete by choosing collateral requirements 
and the rate of interest to screen investors' riskiness" (Bester, 
p. 850), based on the assumption that banks' decisions on 
interest rate and collateral are simultaneous. 
·Two other important ass.umptions condition Bester' s model: 
first, that low-risk borrowers are "able to raise sufficient 
collateral to distinguish themselves from high risk ones" 
(Bester, p. 854);· second, not explicit in Bester's article, is 
the assumption that banks can freely adjust the interest rate on 
loan contracts, to offer different combinations of interest and 
collateral 2 . Exogenous factors can (and do) violate these two 
basic assumptions in rural areas of developing economies. On the 
one hand, restrictions on the resource endowment of "honest" 
borrowers may not allow them to reveal their low-riskiness 
through offering sufficient collateral, (i.e., the small-
farmer/micro-entrepreneur syndrome). on the other hand, 
financial regulations usually constrain the range of (explicit) 
interest-rates that banks can charge on loans. 
Under these constraints, lenders establish mechanisms and 
procedures to allow for collateral substitutes, (e.g., additional 
information and/or inter-linked contracts), and engage in 
1 
2 
This definition follows the discussion of adverse 
selection and incentive effects in Stiglitz and Weiss. 
A good review of this literature, including a thorough 
discussion of Bester's model, is found in Esguerra. 
·. ,. 
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"regulatory avoidance" or implicit-price setting (Kane), to 
compensate for the restrictions on loan-rate differentiation. 
This involves establishing different procedures for credit 
allocation, monitoring, supervision and recovery that create both 
lender and borrower transaction costs. Thus the discriminatory 
application of loan procedures substitutes for explicit-interest 
rate differentiation between borrowers of different riskiness. 
As a consequence, transaction costs (implicit pricing) become an 
important rationing mechanism under interest-rate restrictions. 
The end result of the violation of Bester's two basic 
assumptions in the real world of developing countries is that all 
forms of rationing can be observed: credit refusal (i.e., the 
Stiglitz and Weiss prediction), quantity rationing (Jaffee and 
Russell's model), and rationing through the imposition of 
borrowing transaction costs (implicit pricing). 
- This paper investigates the role and determinants of 
transaction costs of borrowing as a rationing mechanism in 
developing countries. A summary of findings and discussion of 
recent research on borrowing transaction costs is presented 
first. It is shown that these costs are usually substantial, and 
regressively distributed in spite o~ the intended distributional 
goals of low-interest rate credit policies. Next, a conceptual 
framework and a model for the analysis of loan transactions and 
borrowing costs are set forth. Empirical results of the 
application of this model in three developing countries 
(Honduras, Costa Rica and the Philippines) are analyzed. The 
discussion highlights the major determinants of borrowing 
transaction costs and the observed trade-offs between these and 
the different components of the loan contract. Some concluding 
remarks follow. 
Recent Cross-Country Evidence 
This section draws upon results from field surveys reported 
in nine studies of rural credit undertaken between 1981 and 1988. 
Two of these studies correspond to Asian countries (Bangladesh 
and the Philippines), six of them to Latin-American countries 
(Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras in two different years, Panama and 
Peru), while the ninth study was carried out in Niger (West 
Africa). These surveys documented the explicit and implicit non-
interest costs incurred by farmer-borrowers in the process of 
securing and repaying loans. Explicit costs consist primarily of 
transportation, lodging and meal expenses associated with trips 
to the bank off ice, and fees and other cash payments for 
documents and legal procedures. Implicit costs correspond to the 
opportunity cost spent by farmers in negotiating their loans. 
All studies referred to in this section share similar 
research methods. Furthermore, with the exception of Bangladesh, 
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survey questionnaires in all studies were identical or slightly 
modified versions of the instrument first developed in Honduras. 
Another important common feature of all case studies, with the 
possible exception of the Philippines, is the presence of low 
nominal interest rates intended to provide subsidized credit to 
small and medium-sized farms. 
Table 1 summarizes the results reported in the nine case 
studies. Panel A presents the magnitude of transaction costs as 
a percent of the loan amount, while in panel B these transaction 
costs have been expressed as a proportion of the explicit-
interest charges documented in the case studies. This proportion 
indicates the relative importance of transaction costs as a tax 
on the price of liquidity. In both panels, these indicators are 
reported for the sample average of each case, and for three loan-
size categories defined according to the loan-size classification 
of each study. 
On average, transaction costs as a percent of the loan 
amount vary between about 1 percent (Niger} and almost 22 percent 
(Bangladesh). The magnitudes across countries and loan-size 
categories range from 0.2 percent to almost 30 percent. 
There is a striking contrast between the results shown for 
Bangladesh and those reported for the other countries. This 
contrast is accounted for by the unusually small loan sizes 
characteristic of the Bangladesh survey in comparison to those 
recorded elsewhere. This contrast is also reflected in panel B, 
where transaction costs are expressed as percent of explicit-
interest charges. Here transaction costs for Bangladesh are on 
average almost twice as large as the explicit interest charged on 
loans, whereas in the other countries the transaction costs ta~ 
represents (at the sample average) between 4 percent and 85 
percent of explicit interest. It is important to note that these 
findings for Bangladesh were obtained towards the end of the 
"two-for-one'' branching policy in effect between 1977 and 1981 3 
which, it has been argued, would have reduced customer-incurred 
transaction costs in the rural areas (Srinivasan and Meyer). 
Another special case is that of Niger where the low 
borrowing transaction costs observed in Table 1 are better 
explained by an undeveloped and deficient credit delivery system, 
where conventional loan processing practices do not exist 
(Cuevas, Graham and Masini). Here the burden of transaction 
costs in the system lies heavily on the institutions involved, 
rather than on the ultimate borrowers. Nevertheless, even in 
this case the level of transaction costs as a proportion of 
explicit-interest charges is certainly non-negligible. 
3 Ahmed's survey covered loans granted in 1980-1981. 
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In Latin-America, Costa Rica shows transaction costs of 
borrowing sub~tantially higher than every other country (panel 
A), particularly when these costs are expressed as a tax over 
explicit interest charges (panel B). These results appeared 
rather surprising given the development of the nationalized 
banking system, road infrastructure, and educational level of 
bank customers in the country (Gonzalez and Gonzalez). The high 
transaction costs measured here could be explained by the 
rigidities dominating the operations of the branches of the 
"Banco Nacional de Costa Rica", the institution where the sample 
was drawn from (Gonzalez). 
With the exception of Peru and the Philippines, the findings 
presented in Table 1 suggest that borrowing transaction costs 
play an important role as implicit prices in these credit 
markets. Their magnitude certainly cannot be ignored by 
prospective borrowers. 
The figures reported in Table 1 also show the regressive 
distributional effects of borrowing transaction costs. In all 
cases the incidence of transaction costs by loan-size category is 
clearly regressive with small loans bearing high costs and large 
loans entailing the lowest transaction costs as a percent of the 
loan. The tax imposed (via transaction costs) on the explicit 
price of liquidity was thirty times as high for small loans as 
for large loans in the Honduras (1981) study, and ranged between 
3 times and 12 times as high in the other countries. Hence, the 
intended effect of credit polic~es promoting a low and relatively 
uniform interest rate among borrowers is not attained in 
practice. Instead, a skewed, regressive structure of total 
credit costs (interest rate plus transaction costs) is obtained. 
Even when the administered rates are set so that small loans are 
charged a lower rate than medium or large loans, as was the case 
in Costa Rica and Ecuador, transaction costs more than offset the 
explicit interest-rate differential resulting in higher total 
credit qosts for the intended beneficiaries of the policy. 
A Model of Loan· Transactions and Borrowing Costs 
Five of the studies reviewed above have gone beyond the 
descriptive analysis of borrowing transaction costs, and 
investigated the determinants of these costs using econometric 
models. In all cases, a transaction-costs equation has been 
specified where transaction costs are a function of other 
elements of the loan contract (interest rate, collateral, loan 
amount), and a vector of risk-related characteristics of the 
borrower and/or the investments assumed associated with the loan. 
The latter represent the "observable'' characteristics of the 
borrower, with which the lender can construct a subjective 
probability of repayment. This interpretation is consis~ent with 
the theoretical framework proposed in two of these studies 
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(Cuevas, Cuevas and Graham, 1985). Conceptually, this approach 
is based on a credit-rationing framework that considers lenders 
as price-setters of explicit and implicit charges. A revised 
version of this model is outlined below. 
Lenders are assumed to maximize the expected value of their 
profits from each loan operation (n). Expected profits can be 
written as follows4: 
E (n) = rLp + [C - L(l+r)](l-p) - L(d+a) ( 1 ) 
where, r is the interest rate, 
L is the loan amount, 
p is the probability of repayment, 
c is value of collateral, 
d is the per unit cost of loanable funds, and 
a is the (per unit} transaction costs of lending. 
The loan amount, L, is a point in the borrower's demand for 
liquidity, which can be written as: 
L = L(r,W,H) (2) 
where W is a vector of variables representing the firm's resource 
endowment, which conditions the potential size of its 
investments, and H stands for household characteristics 
influencing the liquidity demand for consumption. 
Finally, ·the probability of repayment, p, is assumed 
associated with a set of observable characteristics of the 
borrower denoted by a vector Z, such that, 
p = p(Z) ( 3 ) 
The terms of the loan contract, i.e., r, L, and C, are the 
endogenous variables, while the vectors W, H and Z summarize the 
pre-determined variables in the model comprised by equations (1} 
to (3). 
Borrowing transaction costs (implicit price) are 
incorporated in the model by interpreting the interest rate, r, 
in the broad sense of including explicit and implicit interest. 
The rater will thus consist of an explicit rate (i), and an 
implicit element (t) which result from expressing borrowing 
transaction costs as a percent of the loan amount. It is this 
component (t) of the total price of liquidity that will be 
affected by the variables in the model, since the explicit rate 
(i) is bounded by existing regulations. 
4 A similar definition of the expected revenue component 
in this equation has been proposed by Binswanger. 
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Ex-post, explicit and implicit interest can be added to 
measure the total costs of borrowing, but ex-ante they cannot be 
specified as a sum (i.e., i+t), since there is no reason to 
assume that they are perfect substitutes. Moreover, the trade-
off between these two components of the total costs of borrowing 
is an empirical question. Therefore, a general expression for r 
is the following: 
r = ~{i,t) 
With these changes, the model can be written in general 
reduced form as 
[i,t,L,C] = O(W,H,Z) 
( 4 ) 
( 5 ) 
where the vector on the left-hand side of the equation summarizes 
the endogenous elements of the loan contract 5 . 
All econometric studies reviewed in this section are 
(purposively or not) consistent with this model. They differ in 
the treatment of the endogenous variables in (5), and the 
components of the vectors of pre-determined components of W, H 
and Z. 
The single~equation models of borrowing transaction costs 
(Ahmed, Cuevas, Gonzalez) have specified the explicit-interest 
rate (i) as pre-determined6 , and taken as given the profile of 
loan demand such as loan amount, farm size, enterprise type, and 
other characteristics of the borrower that indicate the magnitude 
of risk involved in individual loan transactions. Thus single-
equation models can be described in terms of the general model 
set forth above by the following expression: 
t = t(i,L,C,Z) ( 6 ) 
The specification of the loan amount as a pre-determined 
variable on the right-hand side of the transaction costs function 
(6) has been questioned in other studies (Cuevas and Graham, 
Abiad), which have specified a loan-demand equation along the 
lines of equation (2) above. If indeed the true model involves a 
loan-demand function where the loan amount depends on the 
magnitude of transaction costs, then the single-equation 
estimation of a transaction costs function would yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the parameters in the model. Under the 
5 
6 
Note that the explicit-interest rate (i) may still be 
considered endogenous, although constrained to take on 
values within an exogenously determined range. 
Omitted in Ahmed. 
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assumption that borrowers do consider transaction costs as part 
of the loan total price, the model is then specified as a system 
of simultaneous equations in which transaction costs and loan 
amount are the endogenous variables: 
t t(L,i,C,Z) 
( 7 ) 
L L(t,i,W,H) 
The following section summarizes the major findings of the 
five econometric studies referred to here. 
Selected Empirical Results 
As indicated above, econometric studies of borrowing 
transaction costs have focused on investigating the trade-offs 
between transaction costs and other elements of the loan 
contract, notably interest rate and loan amount. The 
specification of risk-related characteristics of the borrower, 
and the treatment of the loan demand function has varied across 
case studies depending on the specific approach (see models (6) 
and (7) above), and on data availability. 
The definition and measurement of borrowing transaction 
costs, interest rates, and loan amount is comparable and 
consistent across the different studies reviewed here. 
Collateral, when included in the estimation, has been defined as 
a dummy variable to distinguish real estate collateral from other 
types of loan guarantees. Special attention has been given to 
the variables and proxies included in the risk vector (Z). Area 
of the farm (as a proxy for wealth), previous delinquency status, 
bank-client relationship (deposit reciprocity), end-use of the 
loan, are among the variables specified in different studies as 
components of the Z vector. 
The simultaneous-equations models (Abiad, Cuevas and Graham) 
have used area of the farm, hired labor, and livestock as proxies 
for the resource endowment of the borrower (the W vector in model 
(7)). Household size, and education were used by Abiad to 
represent the liquidity demand for consumption (the H vector in 
model (7)). In most studies, other control variables have been 
included to account for different types of lender (public banks, 
commercial banks, rural banks, credit unions), or specific types 
of borrower (individuals, cooperatives). 
Different logarithmic specifications have been adopted in 
these econometric studies: double-log forms (Abiad, Ahmed, 
Cuevas and Graham), generalized power functions (Cuevas), and 
translogarithmic (Gonzalez). Estimation of single-equation 
models has been undertaken using ordinary least squaresi while 
simultaneous-equations models have been estimated by two-stage 
• 
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least squares. Other estimation techniques such as limited-
information maximum-likelihood, and three-stage least squares do 
not appear to improve either the overall goodness-of-fit or the 
significance of the individual coefficients of the model (Cuevas 
and Graham) . 
The elasticities· between (per unit) borrowing costs and two 
other elements of the loan transaction, loan amount and interest 
rate, are reported in Table 2 for three of the case studies 
reviewed here. These correspond to results of the single-
equation model described by equation (6), applied to Bangladesh, 
Costa Rica, and Honduras (1981 survey). The findings indicate a 
consistent negative elasticity between transaction costs per unit 
(e.g., per dollar) and loan size. The figures in Table 2 show 
that a 10 percent increase in loan size will reduce borrowing 
transaction costs (per dollar borrowed) by 6 to 7 percent. 
On the other hand, the single-equation results in Table 2 
indicate the existence of a clear trade-off between transaction 
costs and interest rate: a one percent (not a one percentage 
point) increase in the interest rate would be compensated, 
ceterisparibus, by a 0.8 or 0.9 percent reduction in transaction 
costs. These results have been interpreted as supportive of 
interest rate reforms, since it implies that increases in 
interest rates will not necessarily increase the total costs of 
borrowing (interest rate + transaction costs) by the same amount 
of the interest-rate increase. 
The key role of transaction costs as price signals in loan 
transactions is clearly supported by the results of the 
simultaneous-equations models (i.e., including a loan demand 
equation). As seen in Table 3, loan amount is inversely and 
significantly related to the magnitude of transaction costs, 
whereas the estimated coefficients for the interest-rate variable 
are not significantly different from zero. A· test for the 
·"total-price" elasticity (i.e., the sum of the estimated 
coefficients for transaction costs and interest rate) did not 
reject the hypothesis of a zero elasticity. This is an 
interesting finding in light of the controversy regarding 
farmers' response to changes in the interest rate. 
The existence of a trade-off between transaction costs and 
interest rates is not supported by the results of simultaneous-
equations models (Table 3). Indeed, explicit-interest rates do 
not appear to affect the behavior of lenders or borrowers, since 
the estimated parameters are not significantly different from 
zero in either the transaction costs (price-setting) equation or 
the loan demand equation. The interpretation of this result in 
the Honduras study (1983 survey) was that the range within which 
interest rates could vary was too narrow to elicit any meaningful 
response by the participants in the market (Cuevas and Graham}. 
~' .• 
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All empirical models reviewed here have provided strong 
support to the specification of a vector (Z) of risk-related 
variables in the transaction costs equation. In addition, the 
results of the simultaneous equations models have supported the 
relevance of resource endowment (the W vector) and household 
characteristics (the H vector) as elements of the loan demand 
function. Other results of importance are that real-estate 
collateral reduce transaction costs of borrowing, and that 
transaction costs vary and respond differently across lending 
institutions7. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has shown that transaction costs of borrowing 
play an important role as implicit prices in rural credit 
markets. Their magnitudes are significant and their regressive 
·distributional effects are substantial. Hence, the intended 
effect of subsidized credit policies are not attained in 
practice. 
The econometric studies reviewed here support the approach 
to modeling loan transactions set forth in this paper. These 
studies have clearly shown the key role of transaction costs as 
price signals in loan transactions. At the same time, the. 
results reported here indicate that the total price of credit· is 
not an important determinant of loan demand in rural areas. 
Two important caveats need to be considered when analyzing 
the studies discussed here. First, these studies have included 
loan transactions in institutional credit markets that 
effectively occurred, i.e., they have omitted intended 
transactions that never took place (unsatisfied loan demand). 
Research currently in progress in the Philippines has found that 
the most important stage in credit rationing is never documented. 
Most credit refusal occurs before the prospective borrower even 
fills in a single form. 
The second important remark refers to the "partial" nature 
of the empirical studies reviewed here. The theoretical 
framework outlined in this paper indicates that all components of 
the loan transaction should be treated as endogenous variables in 
the empirical models. In particular, the simultaneous 
determination of loan price and loan collateral proposed by 
Bester deserves careful applied research. 
7 The results regarding the effect of the loan source 
appear to be sensitive to model specification (single-
equation versus simultaneous equations). 
• 
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Table 1 
Borrowing Transaction Costs at the Farm Level in Selected Countries, by Loan Size 
·---·-·--- -- ·---------------------Country 
Transaction Costs by 
Lou 11 Si :t.l? Baneludesh Phi lip·· Costa 
pines Rica 
Ecuador ___ !!Q!!!!!!r...~ Panama 
1981 1983 
·------------ ------
A. Transaction Costs as 
Percent of Loan Amount 
SC1111p "J e Average 
Small Loans 
.Mc!dium size toans 
Larg·e Loans 
B. Transaction Costs as 
Percent of.Explicit-
Interest Chargesa 
Samp I e Avera1~e 
Small Loans 
M<!dium-sjzt! Loaus 
Lar·ge Loans 
21.7% ]. 2% 
29.4 2.4 
17.5 0.8 
7.0 0.6 
180.8% 6. 7~b 
245.0 13.3 
145.8 4.1 
58. 1 3.3 
11.5% 2.8% 3.0% 3.5% 
15.6 5.3 5.9 5.7 
1.4 2.0 ]. 6 3.0 
2.9 0.6 0.2 1.6 
84.6% 22. ~)% 23. 1% 22.0% 
124.8 47.7 45.4 35.9 
32.8 17.3 J 2. ~~ 18.9 
17.7 4. 1 1. 5 10.1 
---------------·-------------·--
Sources: Ban1~ladesh -- Aluned; Philippines - Abiad; Costa Rica ·- Gonz(alez; 
E1:11ador, Panama and Peru ·- Inter-American Development: Bauk; 
ll11mh11·as 1 H8J Cuevas; llonduras l DB3 ·- Cuevus and Graham. l!Hl5; 
Niger ··Graham, Cuevas, and Negash. 
5.2% 
5.7 
3.0 
2.0 
46.4% 
50.9 
26.8 
17.9 
Peru 
]. 2% 
3.9 
l.3 
1.0 
1. o~.; 
13.0 
4.3 
3.3 
Njeer 
0.9% 
5.8 
1. 8 
0.5 
7.5% 
48.3 
15.0 
4.2 
a C1_1111pul1!d as (Triwsac:Uon cost.s/JJ1t.e1·est. chiu·gt!s)*lOO, usJ11e 11w explicit-interest rat.es reported h1 
ll11~ dil'fer·ent sources, e.i~ .. for Bangladesh, the interest rate reported by Ahmed is 12%. hence, for 
Uw ~;wupl<! ;1veri1ge, (2J.7/12)*JOO " JB0.8%. 
,_...,._ .. .,,__,.,,. 
... 
' 
I-' 
N 
13 
Table 2 
Elasticities of Borrowing Transaction Costs with respect to 
Selected Variables Estimated in Single-Equation Models 
in Three Case Studies 
Case Studies 
Explanatory 
Variablea Bangladesh Costa Rica Honduras 
Loan amount -0.56 
Interest rate n.a. -0.81 - . 
Sources: Bangladesh - Ahmed; Costa Rica - GonzAlez; 
Honduras - Cuevas. 
--0.66 
a All estimHtcd elasticities significantly different from 
zero. 
b Estimate for basic-grains loans. Estimate for cxport-
crop loans was -0.79. 
c Not significantly different from one. 
Table 3 
Estimated Parameters of Selected Variables in the Transaction Costs 
Equation and the Loan Demand Equation in Two Case Studies 
Jointly-dependent Variables I Case Studies 
Right-hand Side 
Variablea 
Loan amount 
Transaction costs 
Interest rate 
Transa_~tion Cos~--
Honduras Philippines 
0.297 0.607 
(0.698) (0.886) 
0.239 0.587 
(0.521) (0.·154) 
Loan Amount 
- ------"~-'- -----
Honduras Phil4ppines 
* * 
-1.584 -0.327 
(-4.481) (-2.205) 
0.984 -0. 292 
( 1. 564) (-0.4-14) 
Sources: Honduras - Cuevas and Graham; Philippines - Abiad. 
a T-ratios in parenthesis. 
* Significant at 0.01 level. 
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